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Abstract: What happens when liquidity increases in credit markets and more funds are channeled from
borrowers to lenders? We examine this question in a general equilibrium model where financial matchmakers
help borrowers (firms) and lenders (households) search out and negotiate profitable matches and where the
composition of heterogeneous borrowers adjusts to satisfy equilibrium entry conditions. We find that enhanced
liquidity causes entry by all borrowers and tends to benefit low-quality borrowers disproportionately. However,
liquid credit markets may or may not be associated with higher output and welfare. The result is determined
by whether the effect of higher market participation outweighs that of lower average quality. The net effect
depends crucially on the source of the liquidity shock (financial matching efficacy, productivity, or entry
barriers).
JEL classification: C78, E44, G21
Key words: financial matchmaking, search and entry frictions, credit composition effects1The matching framework is based on ideas developed by Burdett and Mortensen (1981),
Pissarides (1984), and Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995).   
2Our financial intermediaries simply match lenders and borrowers but do not independently
demand or supply funds.  The latter activity typifies “marketmakers” (cf. Yavas 1992).
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Financial Matchmakers in Credit Markets with Heterogeneous Borrowers
1.  Introduction 
To paraphrase Fama (1980), financial intermediation is neutral without market frictions.  As the
subsequent literature has shown, financial intermediation enhances the aggregate efficiency of
investment by counteracting informational frictions and overcoming technological non-convexities. 
However, the literature has neglected the fact that financial intermediaries also help alleviate search and
entry frictions.  Search frictions arise because seeking out trades and bargaining over contracts takes
time and this gives a matchmaking role to financial intermediaries and a mediating role in contract
negotiations.  Entry frictions arise because market participation for firms is costly and this in turn implies
that the pool of credit applicants (or the demand for credit) responds to liquidity in financial markets. 
Both frictions together mean that financial intermediation may enhance the aggregate efficiency of
investment by influencing the quality and size of the credit applicant pool and the frequency with which
credit contracts are made.
To explore the role of search and entry frictions in credit markets, we restrict our attention to
studying the matchmaking function of financial intermediaries, developing a model of pairwise
meetings where finding a match takes time.
1  For illustrative purposes, let us refer to lenders as
households and to borrowers as firms.  Households would like to lend a part of their endowment to firms
who need to finance their productive activity.  Financial matchmakers own a matching technology that
facilitates transactions between lenders and borrowers by stochastically bringing them together.
2  Thus,
our framework generalizes the “credit search” model of Diamond (1990) and our financial matchmakers3Our matchmakers can therefore be regarded as primitive forms of banks.  See Chou (1970) for a
discussion of the money store in ancient China, such as kung-hsieh-ben-hong and chien-chuang which
were created to balance funds demand and supplies by pairing borrowers and lenders.  The rotating
saving and credit association considered in Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) is similar to the money store
but without pairing.
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are similar to the “middlemen” defined in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Biglaiser(1993) or Yavas
(1994).  Financial matchmaking here captures the main features of the “money store”in ancient China
and in several developing countries, and the services provided are also similar to those provided by
mortgage brokers in modern economies.
3  In particular, financial matchmakers are endowed with a more
effective random matching technology than the random matches found in nature, yet their matching
technology is imperfect and subject to frictions.  
Once a borrower and a lender are brought together, financial matchmakers mediate a loan
contract.  The contract specifies the loan rate paid by firms and a return to households, and divides the
net surplus of the match according to the agents’ bargaining power.  While firms differ according to their
productivity, riskiness, and cost structure, these attributes are common knowledge and hence there does
not exist an adverse-selection or a moral hazard problem.  Moreover, in order to highlight the role of
search and entry frictions in financial matchmaking, we abstract from the risk pooling function of
financial intermediaries who offer households a safe return.  Equilibrium in this model is reflected by the
endogenous matching rates of firms and households that determine market liquidity and the amount of
household funds channeled to firms.  Equilibrium is also reflected by the number of active and inactive
credit relationships whereby credit market tightness is measured by the share of unmatched projects from
the credit applicant pool which can be interpreted as a frictional capital unemployment rate.
In his pivotal work, Townsend (1978) compares bilateral and centralized trading and shows that
there exists an efficiency-enhancing role for middlemen who actively participate in trades.  Yet, the
matching process by which trading agents are paired is not modeled, whereas in our paper the process is
explicit and serves to overcome search time frictions.  There do exist a few models of search in credit4Also, in a more remotely related study, Huffman (1996) considers search in capital markets with
exogenous matching rates.
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markets that give a potential role for middlemen such as Diamond (1990) and Den Haan, Ramey, and
Watson (1999).  Like in our model, financial intermediaries are assumed to play a passive role by
enabling more effective matching between borrowers and lenders.  However, their papers assume
exogenous rates of matching, while ours determines matching probabilities in general equilibrium.
4  
Our paper is also related to the middleman literature which focuses on the emergence and
equilibrium pattern of intermediated trade.  Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) consider random matching
between demanders and suppliers or between middlemen and demanders/suppliers under complete
information, where middlemen emerge and capture a percentage of the matching surplus.  Biglaiser
(1993) constructs a bargaining model with asymmetric information about quality and correlated
valuations where middlemen become experts in their fields and reduce adverse selection related
inefficiencies.  Yavas (1994) assumes that matching between demanders/suppliers and middlemen is
immediate, whereas with private information and endogenous search intensity middlemen arise when
search is too costly and random matching is very ineffective.  While the financial matchmakers in our
paper are not as active as the middlemen in the above studies, we do not rule out a more active role for
our matchmakers that allows them to extract a percentage of the matching surplus (see the discussion in
the concluding section).   However, we keep our financial activity as simple as possible to focus on how
search and entry frictions influence credit market liquidity and the aggregate efficiency of investment.
We emphasize that it is not the purpose of this paper to establish why financial intermediaries or
matchmakers are formed.  Also, the model is highly stylized to highlight the main structure of our
analysis and the underlying intuition.  Notably, there is no closely related study of financial matchmaking
or credit search where the equilibrium composition of heterogeneous firms affects the efficiency of
investment.  However, the conventional financial intermediation literature does suggest that composition5Specific ways by which financial intermediaries affect the composition of the aggregate
investment portfolio include risk pooling, liquidity management and effective monitoring.  See Becsi and
Wang (1997) among many other surveys of the voluminous financial intermediation literature.  
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effects are important for aggregate activity.  Many of the traditional arguments of how banks affect the
composition of the aggregate investment portfolio boil down to the idea that in one way or another
financial intermediaries give agents access to financial economies of scale that they would not have
otherwise.
5  By contrast, in our paper financial matchmakers bring households and heterogeneous firms
together and mediate contracts that share surpluses between two matching parties depending on relative
bargaining positions.  At the same time, there is differential entry across different types in response to
perceived profit opportunities.  Thus, by allowing sufficient flexibility in loan contracts to accommodate
changing perceptions, financial matchmakers help allocate funds to investment projects by alleviating
search frictions, which is distinct from the existing literature.
We prove the existence and the uniqueness of a nondegenerate steady-state search equilibrium
with endogenous entry.  Then we analyze the effects of shocks to financial structure and firms’
profitability and show that the comparative statics depend crucially on the response of endogenous
matching rates and differential entry.  Generally, any shock that enhances matching rates causes
aggregate liquidity to rise.  While an increase in liquidity increases market participation by all firms, we
show that low quality firms benefit disproportionately and the average quality of firms falls (unless the
shock also raises the relative profitability of low quality firms).  Thus, liquid credit markets may or may
not be associated with high output and welfare, depending on whether the market participation effect
outweighs the composition effect on average quality.  Welfare may fall when the composition effect is
large, so that it is possible to have outcomes in a complete information framework that resemble results
found in models with asymmetric information (Biglaiser and Friedman, 1999).  
Our analysis demonstrates that the balance of market participation and composition effects
depends on the source of increased market liquidity.  Specifically, profitability shocks (or shocks to6These functions are assigned to the matchmaker without loss of generality.  For example, the
matchmaking role can be derived from optimizing behavior where intermediaries maximize the measure
of matched agents given that each agent pays a fee to use the matching technology. 
5
productivity and entry costs) that enhance aggregate liquidity usually have strong market participation
effects.  By contrast, financial market structure shocks such as enhanced matching efficacy increase
market liquidity and participation, but because of a strong composition effect output and welfare may rise
or fall.  When the financial market structure shock is due to lower contract quit rates, the outcome is
enhanced liquidity and strong market participation effects.  Thus, because lower contract quit rates tend
to lengthen contractual relationships (that are not guaranteed with random contract renegotiation), long-
term relationships are positively related to output and loan rates consistent with evidence by Petersen and
Rajan (1994).  Finally, we also show that ex ante loan rate spreads depend only on differential
profitability shocks, but that realized credit spreads also depend on offsetting market participation and
composition effects. 
2.  The Basic Environment
Time is continuous.  The economy is populated with a continuum of identical households of unit
mass and a continuum of firms of mass I.  There are two types of firms indexed by i that are
distinguished by their riskiness and productivity and by their mass I
i.  Identical financial matchmakers
own a matching technology that they use to bring together households and firms, a role that we will refer
to as their matchmaking function.  While a firm’s type is known to all, the number of firms of various
types is endogenously determined by unrestricted entry with differential costs.  As financial matchmakers
devise loan contracts, they influence the equilibrium allocation of investment projects, referred to as their
allocation function.  Thus, our framework highlights the importance of search and entry frictions in
providing a primitive role for financial intermediaries.
6
Each household is endowed with an apple tree that generates flow income normalized to one6
unit. What they do with their income depends on the financial environment.  Since there is a large
number of borrowers and lenders, the probability of rematches in a random environment is zero.  Thus, in
the absence of financial matchmaking, no lender would grant the validity of IOUs from borrowers. 
Further assume that matches between borrowers and lenders are negligible.  Under these circumstances,
each household consumes a flow value of one.  By contrast, such flow income can earn positive returns
in the case of a completely financially intermediated economy.  Households do not have access to the
production technology and hence are seeking opportunities to gain a gross rate of return of R  >1 on their
savings, depending on the type of firm they are matched with using the financial matchmaker.
Firms have access to a production technology and are productive only when they have secured an
investment loan.  Without loss of generality, let type 1 firm have access to a low-risk, low-return
investment project whereas the type 2 firm has access to a high-risk, high-return project.  Membership in
the population set I
i is determined by a completely random lottery process.   Upon paying an entry (or
start-up) cost vo
i , type i firms enter the loanable funds market and search for loanable funds to implement
the investment project.  Let N
i denote the (endogenous) fraction of type i firms entering the loanable
funds market, which need not be the same as the ex ante population share I
i.  For simplicity, we assume
.  When matched with a household, a type i firm produces flow output A
i with probability p
i N 1  N 2  1
and zero with probability (1-p
i).  Thus, conditional on receiving a loan, the type i firm’s value of output
net of resource cost is: . Y i  A i
Specifically, we assume throughout the paper that the high-type pays a higher entry fee, that is, 





on average, but face a lower success rate:
 
(A1) (Productivity) A 2 > A 1
(A2) (Success Rate) p 2 < p 17
(A3) (Expected Productivity) p 2A 2 > p 1A 1 >1 .
The output of financial matchmakers is measured as the amount of successful matches between
borrowers and lenders.  The output is produced according to a matching technology (discussed in more
detail below), where the inputs are the total funds available for lending and the amount desired for
projects.  While the matchmaking mechanism is essentially a Diamond-type anonymous random
matching machine, one version of our framework allows financial matchmakers to affect the efficacy of
the matching technology after paying a real resource cost.  Financial matchmakers write contracts that
specify the amount of the loan, equal to the unit endowment of the matched household, and an interest
rate, R
i, both corresponding to the type i claimed by the individual firm.
The loanable funds market is spatially separated and funds are channeled from lenders to
borrowers every time a match is made between households and firms.  Individual households or firms
may either be matched or unmatched.  Let H be the mass of searching and unmatched households and F
be the searching firms, where N
iF represents the population of type i firms searching for funds.  The mass
of matched households is denoted by S and by construction the mass of matched household equals the
mass of matched firms, or S = 1-H.  Also, we designate µ as the household’s flow probability of finding a
match with a firm and η as the firm’s probability of matching with a household.  
Unmatched households consume their flow endowment or, should lending prove profitable (i.e.,
R >1), they proceed to search for a match in the loanable funds market.  Once matched with a firm, they
lend their endowment and consume the returns of their savings, R.  In order to isolate the funds pooling
function of financial intermediation, we assume that risk pooling is absent and thus a matched household
earns returns from an investment project from its contracted firm according to terms set by the financial
matchmaker.  Once a household and firm are matched, there is also a probability of separation which
occurs at rate δ.  While this separation rate is treated as exogenous, it’s potential impact on the7This term is used in the Schumpeterian sense of Aghion and Howitt (1992) that a factor forcing
households and firms to separate may generate higher individual welfare.
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endogenous entry and exit decisions of firms of each type will have implications for the degree of
“creative destruction.”
7  If households are not matched, they consume at the autarky value and wait for a
potential match in the future.  Notice that it is the anonymous nature of the matching process prevents
individual households and firms from setting up enforceable contracts and long-term relationships with
each other; hence providing the contracting role for the matchmaker.
We now formalize the flow value associated with searching and matched households of type
i=1,2.  Denote Ju as the value associated with an unmatched household and Jm
i as the value associated
with a household matched with a type i firm.  We then have:
Equation (1) says that the flow value associated with an unmatched household is the sum of the flow rate
of consumption of the endowment good and net values gained from being matched with a type i firm (Jm
i
- Ju) which arrives at rate µ, weighted by their respective proportions N
1 and N
2.  Equation (2)  says that
the flow value of a household matched with a type i firm is the sum of the expected returns to the match
generated from the loan contract R
i and the net value of separation from that firm and re-entering the pool
of unmatched households, which occurs at rate δ.  
Similarly for firms, let Πu
i and Πm denote, respectively, the unmatched and matched value
associated with a firm of type i.  These asset values can be specified as:8We take Πu
i parametrically because atomistic, competitive firms have no bargaining power over


















u  p i[A iR i]
rδη
(6)
Equation (3) gives the flow value of an unmatched firm of each type as the product of the rate by which
they contact searching households, η,  and the net value of becoming matched (Πm
i - Πu
i).  Equation (4)
specifies the flow value of a matched firm of each type as the sum of the net expected productivity of the
investment project made possible by the loan contract, less the interest costs, and the net gain of
separation, Πm
i - Πu
i, which occurs at rate δ.
Using (1) through (4), we derive the potential (ex ante) gain that accrues from a successful
match:
Equation (5) indicates that the relative value of a household being matched to a type i firm is increasing
in the discounted flow of endowments and in the expected return spread between lending to a type i firm
and lending to a type j firm.  A positive expected rate of return (p
i R
i > 1) is necessary and sufficient to
guarantee  Jm > Ju and thus active intermediation.  Equation (6) shows that the relative value of a
matched type i firm is strictly increasing in the discounted endowment flow and the net expected profits
from the investment project. 
Since firms are atomistic, each of the type i firms takes Πu
i as parametric in the loanable funds
market.
























Thus, the expected gain for each firm that accrues from a successfully mediated match depends positively
on the expected output net of the interest payment (p
 i(A
i - R
i )) and negatively on the flow market value of
being unmatched (rΠu
i ).  In other words, the expected gain for each firm accrued from a successful match




i ) - rΠu
i .
3.  Bargaining, Matching and Entry
Nash Bargaining
Once households and firms meet through a financial matchmaker’s “random matching machine”
, they bargain in a cooperative manner based on their respective threat points, i.e., unmatched values ˜ M
Ju.  Consider a cooperative Nash bargain which gives a share β of the matched surplus to households and








for i = 1,2.  Regarding Πu
i as parametric, substitution of (5) and (7) into (8) gives:






(p iR i1)µN j
rδ
[(p iR i1)  (p jR j1)] (9)
This expression clearly illustrates that the outcomes of both types of firms are interdependent because
households’ threat points depend on the expected returns of both types .  
Total differentiation of (9) produces a preliminary characterization of the “interest offer
function” in the following:11




i , δ) is increasing in the household contact
rate, µ, the own-type productivity, A
i, and decreasing in the fraction of type 1 firms entered into the
loanable funds market, N
1, the own-type unmatched value of firms, Πu
i , and the separation rate, δ. 
While most of the results are straightforward and intuitive, the two results related to the
endogenous arguments in the interest offer function deserve further comments.  First, from equation (1),
an increase in the fraction of type 1 firms entering into the loanable funds market lowers the unmatched
value of households ( ) which is their bargaining threat point.  As a consequence of the reduced Ju
bargaining power of households, the interest offer decreases.  Second, an increase in the contact rate of
households by contrast raises their threat point, thus leading to higher interest offer. 
Steady-State Matching
So far, we have only mentioned the random anonymous matching machine M without detailed
specification.  Recall that the masses of searching households and firms are H and F, respectively. 
Searching agents enter the loanable funds market and make use of the random matching technology
supplied by the matchmaker.  Upon a successful match and after the financial contract has been signed,
households realize their returns after production is completed (which may be high or low, revealed ex
post).   Steady-state matching in the loanable funds market requires that the flow of firms of both types
seeking loanable funds equals the flow of households providing loanable funds.  Thus, given a household
contact rate µ and a firm contact rate η, we have:
µH  ηF  m0 ˜ M(H,F) (10)
where    is a funds matching function that satisfies the following properties: strictly increasing and ˜ M(,)
strictly concave in each argument, homogeneity of degree one, standard Inada conditions and boundary
conditions [i.e.,  ].  The anonymous nature of financial matchmakers’ random ˜ M(0,) ˜ M(,0) 012
matching technology prevents matches between a “preferred” household with a high type of firm.  This
thereby rules out the possibility of coalitions among a subset of actors.  Moreover, it may be thought of
that in the absence of financial matchmaking, the random matching by nature is captured by  m ˜ M(H,F)
where  .  For simplicity, in the benchmark economy we assume throughout that   mM[0,m0) m  0.
Dividing through by the second argument in the matching function and substituting for H/F
yields:
η  m0 M η
µ
(11)
This relationship describes η as a negative function of µ which is a “Beveridge curve” (or BC) for the
loanable funds market.  Under the above-specified properties, we have:
Lemma  1: (Beveridge Curve)  The Beveridge curve, (11), is downward-sloping in (µ,η)-space, convex
to the origin, and asymptotes to both axes.  It shifts away from the origin as the matching parameter, m0 ,
increases.
In addition to the Beveridge curve relationship, the household population in steady state is fixed
at unity.  This requirement implies that the inflow of households entering the loanable funds market to
search for projects (after having been separated from other projects) must equal the outflow from the
market, or
δS  µH (12)
Due to free entry, the population of firms is determined endogenously.
Free Entry of Firms
As there is unrestricted entry of firms of both types, subject to entry costs, the unmatched values9This, of course, requires that the ex-ante population of each type of firm, I
i, is sufficiently large.
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Substituting (6) into (3) and combining the resulting expressions with the last expression yields two zero-










Lemma 2:  The firm contact rate of type i that satisfies the zero profit condition is increasing in the own-
type entry cost, vo
i, the interest offer, R




The underlying intuition is clear-cut once we keep in mind that zero profit requires a negative
relationship between the net gains of firms accrued from a successful match and the firm contact rates. 
As net gains rise, more firms of a type tend to participate in the credit market (to restore zero profit),
which lowers the probability that an individual firm will locate a household.
4.  Equilibrium 
All conditions that must be met in steady-state equilibrium are summarized by:14
Definition:  A steady-state equilibrium with full information is a tuple {R
i, µ, η, H, S, F, N
1, Πu
i} for i =
1, 2, satisfying:
(i) Nash bargaining:  (9) for i = 1, 2;
(ii) steady-state matching and separation:  (10), (11) and (12);
(iii) free entry and zero profit:  (13) for i = 1, 2  and (14);
(iv) population identity:  S + H = 1.
Note that the free entry conditions immediately pin down Πu
i, whereas (9) (for i=1,2), (11), and (14) do
not depend on any population mass except for N
1.  Thus, these five equations can be used jointly to solve
for, in addition to N
1, two interest rates and two contact rates.
For notational convenience, let   ,    ,      B L [(1β)/β](rδ)/(rδµ) ¯ a i L p iA i  rν
i
0 a i L ¯ a iB,




1<0 and du/dµ>0.  Then we u i L N iuu L µ/(rδ)  u 1u 2
can rewrite the Nash bargaining conditions (9) to give:
a i  (1BBu j)p iR i  Bu jp jR j i1,2, i£j
This system yields the solution




¯ a j  ¯ a i N j (15)
To ensure sensible results, we impose:
 






Moreover, to have active intermediation for low type firms, we need  p
1 R




(1N 1)(¯ a 2  ¯ a 1).
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or,
10 ¯ a 1 >1,
Condition F:  (Active Intermediation)        p 1A 1  1>rν
1
0.
Obviously, given Condition D, Condition F is stronger than Assumption (A3) and it is sufficient but not
necessary for active intermediation.  Conditions D and F imply   and both are sufficient to ¯ a 2 >¯ a 1 >1
guarantee active intermediation for both high and low type firms (i.e.,   ).  J
i
m > Ju
Comparative Statics for Expected Interest Rates
From (15) we derive the following comparative statics effects on the (expected) return to investing in
each firm type i = 1,2:
Proposition 2: (Comparative Statics for Expected Interest Rates)
(i) Productivity:  jp
iR
i/jA
i > 0  for i,j = 1,2;
(ii) Entry Effect:  jp
1R
1/jN
1 =  jp
2R
2/jN
1 < 0 < jp
1R
1/jN




(iii) Matching Rate:  jp
1R
1/jµ =  jp
2R
2/jµ > 0 ;
(iv) Separation:  jp
1R
1/jδ  =  jp
2R
2/jδ < 0 ;
(v) Entry Costs:  jp
iR
i/jν0
i < 0 for i = 1,2.
Proof: See Appendix. −
The intuition behind this Proposition can be given as follows.  An increase in A
i increases the net
gains to a match for both the household and firm.  However, it raises the net gains to the firm by a greater
proportion and hence an increase in the expected returns to the household is required to satisfy the
bargaining rule.  An increase in the productivity of type j£i firms increases the threat point of households16
p 2R 2  p 1R 1  β(¯ a 2 ¯ a 1) (16)
R 2  R 1  β ¯ a 2
p 2  ¯ a 1
p 1  1β
rδβµ
βµ(N 1¯ a 1N 2¯ a 2)  r  δ 1
p 2  1
p 1 (17)
matched to a type i firm and hence raises the expected interest payment required from the match.  
A change in the proportion of types of firms in the market, N
i, impacts both the threat point of
households and firms.  An increase in N
1 lowers the threat point of a matched low type firm and tends to
increase the expected returns to the household implied by the bargaining solution.  However, it also
lowers the threat point of households matched to low type firms by lowering their unmatched value Ju. 
Because this latter effect dominates, jR
1/jN
1 < 0.  An increase in N
1 also lowers Jm but increases the
threat point of high type firms, both effects leading to jR
2/jN
1 < 0.  Similarly, an increase in the fraction
of high type firms, N
2, strengthens the relative bargaining position of households matched with both high
and low type firms so that jR
1/jN
2 > 0 and jR
2/jN
2 > 0.
An increase in the household matching rate µ lowers the relative value of being matched to either
type firm and hence households require an increase in the expected returns to the match.  Conversely, an
increase in separation rate δ lowers the threat point of households by a greater proportion than firms and
decreases the expected returns to households.  Finally, entry costs effects are entirely symmetric and
opposite to the effects of changes in productivity.
Interest-Rate Spreads
From (5) we can compute the expected interest spread between high and low type firms and the actual
interest rate spread as
 
where   depending on the limµSQ,v
i
oS0 R 2R 1  β(A 2A 1)(1β)(1/p 2  1/p 1)(N 1p 1A 1N 2p 2A 21) > 0
productivity as well as risk differential.  We can show:17
 





1) and the actual (R
2 - R
1) interest rate spreads are positive.  The expected interest rate spread
is driven by the expected profitability differential    While the actual interest rate spread in a (¯ a 2 ¯ a 1).
frictionless economy (with  ) is determined by productivity as well as risk differentials, µSQ and v
i
0S0
such a spread is smaller in an economy with search and entry frictions. 
Proof: See Appendix. −
 
Condition D says that a positive expected and actual interest spread between high and low types requires
that the productivity differential between high and low types be sufficiently large relative to the flow
entry cost differential so that    Hence, interest paid type 2 always exceeds that of type 1 in both ¯ a 2 >¯ a 1.
expectations and realization.  In general, both the ex ante and ex post interest rate spreads depend
positively on the expected net productivity differential.  The difference between the two is that the actual
or realized interest rate spread (which may be referred to as the credit spread) also depends on the
composition of firms (decreasing in the fraction of low quality firms) and the household contact rate
(positively).   Both the composition and contact-rate effects on the actual interest rate spread diminishes
as firm’s bargaining power (1-β) decreases.  In a frictionless economy where intermediated matching is
instantaneous as in Yavas (1994) and firm entry is costless (i.e.,    and  ), productivity and risk µSQ v
i
0S0
differentials pin down the actual interest rate spread.  When intermediated matching is not instantaneous
as considered by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) and when there are entry frictions, such a spread
becomes smaller due to the composition effect caused by heterogeneity in entry costs and success rates. 
Steady-State Equilibrium
Given the properties of the interest rate function considered above, we now consider








δ < 0, R
i
N
1 < 0.  Given the interest functions R
i, steady-state {µ*,η*,N
1*} thus satisfy (11) and (14).11Note that D is less than the net profitability differential ( ) because entry (1β)(¯ a 2 ¯ a 1)/(rv
2
0)
costs differ.  This can be seen by using    to rewrite D as  p 2R 2p 1R 1β(¯ a 2 ¯ a 1)

















1 affects D  (through R
1 ) only when relative entry costs differ.  Finally, note that































Lemma 3: (Equilibrium Zero-Profit Trace)  Both the ZP
1 and ZP
2  loci described by (14) are downward
sloping in (N




2.  Furthermore, there exists a unique and
upward sloping equilibrium zero-profit trace EZ in (N
1,η)-space, η = η
Z(N
1) that satisfies (14) for a given
µ such that there is a N
1
min > 0   yielding  η
Z(N
1
min ) = 0  and  Q > η
max L η
Z(1) > 0.
Proof: See Appendix.  −
The  ZP
1 and ZP
2  loci and the EZ trace in (N
1,η)-space are shown in Figure 1.  How these curves relate
to the Beveridge Curve in (µ,η)-space is also shown.  These relationships together pin down the steady-
state equilibrium {µ*,η*,N
1*}.   
Satisfying both ZP conditions in (14) would necessarily imply:









The term D measures the expected net surplus differential between high and low type firms, or, in short,
the firm surplus differential.  The firm surplus differential is less than the profitability differential
because high type firms must pay a larger entry cost to get it.
11  When D is positive, the share of low type
firms must rise to drive the firm surplus differential back down to equilibrium.  To see this, when N
1 rises
for a given µ*, households are more likely to contact low type firms.   This weakens the ability of  high19
type firms to extract a higher surplus from households and D falls.  Thus, any changes resulting in D > 0
would require an increase in N
1 to restore zero profit.  For example, an increase in µ* or a decrease in δ
will ultimately increase N
1.  These arguments are useful for understanding the comparative static results
derived in Section 5.
Given {µ*,η*}, we then use (11) and (12) to solve for the equilibrium masses of firms and
households:
H   δ
δ  µ (18)
S   1  H   µ
δµ (19)
F   δµ
(δµ)η (20)
These three equations imply that the mass of searching households is negatively related to the household
contact rate.  Also, the mass of matched household-firm pairs depends positively on the household
contact rate.  Finally, the mass of searching firms is increasing in the household contact rate but
decreasing in the firm contact rate.  
The above arguments lead to the following theorem:
 
Theorem:  (Existence and Uniqueness)  Under Assumptions (A1) and (A2) and Conditions D and F,
there exists a unique, non-degenerate steady-state equilibrium with full information if the expected
production gains are sufficiently high such that η
* ε (0, η
max ). 
Proof:  The existence and uniqueness will be proved in two steps.  First, we claim that the BC and EZ
loci uniquely determine steady-state {µ*,η*,N
1*}.  It is clear from the proof of Lemma 3 and expression
(14) that as long as the expected production gains are sufficiently high such that η
* ε (0, η
max ), N
1* is20
bounded in the interval (0,1].  Then as the determinant of the pre-multiplied matrix of system (11) and
(14) is strictly positive, the implicit function theorem implies unique determination of steady-state
{µ*,η*,N
1*}.  Thus, for a given pair {µ,η} satisfying (BC), there exists a unique pair {η,N
1} which
satisfies (EZ).  Once we obtain the equilibrium matching rates µ*,η* and fraction of low to high type
firms, N





1)F*.  Since (18)-(20) are all well-defined monotone functions, the determination of these
masses is also unique. −
 
5.  Comparative Statics
We are now prepared to characterize the steady-state equilibrium.  In addition to examining the
determinants of the equilibrium matching rates, the composition and the mass of the matched firms, and
the gross rates of interest, we are also interested in the percentage of unmatched projects, the aggregate
output of the matched firms, and welfare.  
Specifically, from (17) we note that S*  the equilibrium number of matches is positively related
to µ*/ δ .  This term reflects the markets’ liquidity because it is also equal to the aggregate share of
household funds that is channeled to firms.   The size of the credit market is measured by S*+F* which
adds market participants that are matched to market participants that are unmatched and still searching. 
Then define U* = F*/(F*+S*) as the share of unmatched projects in the credit applicant pool which
includes all entrants.  This term can be regarded as the “capital-unemployment rate,” which measures the
tightness of the credit market much like the unemployment rate in the labor market.  Since F*=S*( δ/η
*),
we find that U* = 1/(1+(η
*/δ)) and thus, our measure of capital-unemployment depends on search and
entry frictions solely through the factor δ/η
*. 
Next, we propose the following measure for the aggregate flow output, based only on the steady-
state masses of matched firms, S*N
i (i = 1,2):  12 Equivalently, production normality requires that the direct effect of productivity on output
dominates.
13 Notice from equation (1) that this unmatched value takes the expected values of future matches
into account and that consumption is instantaneous. 
14 Also,   . (rδ) J
i
m  Ju  p iR i  1  βµ
rδβµ
(¯ a 2  1)  N 1(¯ a 2  ¯ a 1)
21
Y   S  [N 1A 1  (1N 1)A 2] (21)
The aggregate output measure can be decomposed into two components.  One component, S*, reflects
aggregate matches and enhanced market liquidity (and enhanced market participation).  Another
component, the square bracket term, reflects the composition of output and can be interpreted as the
average output over all matched firms.  Because the two components need not always move in the same
direction, we assume that in the event of offsetting movements that movements in Y* reflect movements
in  S*, or:
12 
Condition P:  (Production normality)    The market participation effect on Y* dominates the
composition effect on Y*.
 
It may be noted that economic welfare in this simple benchmark model is mainly driven by the
net productivity differential.  Because ex ante profits of competitive firms reach zero in equilibrium,
welfare can be measured purely by the ex ante value of households, which is their unmatched value Ju.
13 
From equations (1) , (5) and (15) we have:
14
rJu  1  βµ
rδβµ
(¯ a 2  1)  N 1(¯ a 2  ¯ a 1) (22)
Clearly, the welfare measure is increasing in the net productivity of all firms but decreasing in the net
productivity differential and the share of low type firms.  Furthermore the welfare measure rises with the
household contact rate but falls with the separation rate. 15While Figure 1 is useful in illustrating the uniqueness of steady state equilibrium, the
comparative statics cannot be easily captured graphically since there are significant feedback effects
between the matching rates and the fraction of firm types in the market.
22
Tedious but straightforward comparative-static analysis yields:
 
Proposition 4: (Financial Structure Shocks) Under the circumstances described in the Theorem, the
effects of matching efficiency (m0) and separation rate (δ ) on steady-state {η*, µ*, N
1*, R
i*, S*, U*, Y*,
Ju
*} are given by:
(i)   An improvement in bank’s matching productivity generates more matches and leads to a greater
fraction of low-type firms.  
(ii)   An increase in the contract quit rate will raise the firm contact rate and reduce the capital
unemployment rate but lower household contact rates and market liquidity.  Also, the share of
low type firms will fall.  Assuming production normality, interest rates, output and welfare fall,
otherwise the effect is uncertain. 
Proof: See Appendix. −
 
Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics results for the complete information equilibrium.
15 
First, we discuss what happens when bank matching efficiency increases. Intuitively, an increase in
bank’s matching productivity increases the contact rate for households µ* and encourages firm’s entry.  
The overall level of matchmaking activity increases (as captured by a rise in S*) because of higher
household contact rates.  From Proposition 3 we know that a rise in the household contact rate raises the
interest offer to each firm by an equal amount.  This tends to increase the expected net surplus
differential (D) so that there is a disproportionate entry by low type firms as indicated by an increase in
N
1*.  
This composition effect puts downward pressure on loan rates and is sufficiently strong that they
return to where they originally were.  Thus, there is no net effect on loan rates and on the firm matching23
rate η*.  Because the firm matching rate is unchanged, the capital unemployment rate is unaffected. 
Recall from the discussion of Proposition 1 that N
1* and µ* have opposing effects on the unmatched
value of households.  Because composition effects can be strong, the net effect of market liquidity and
composition effects on household’s ex ante welfare, Ju*, is uncertain.   Similarly to the uncertain welfare
effect, an increase in matching efficiency creates two offsetting forces on output.  More matchmaking
means higher output because of greater market participation, but this effect is offset by the fact that there
are relatively more low type firms in the economy.
Next we ask what happens following an increase in the contract quit rate δ, which could arguably
be interpreted as an exogenous bank run or less dramatically as increased resistance towards long-term
financial relationships.   An increase in  δ  reduces the unmatched value of all firms relative to their entry
cost, lowers their threat points, and induces firm exit.  Thus, firm contact rates of surviving firms rise by
the zero-profit condition which reinforces the negative direct effect of contract quits on capital
unemployment.  From the Beveridge curve relationship, household contact rates fall which causes a
reduction in market liquidity and a fall in the overall level of matchmaking,  S*.   While fewer productive
firms means output falls, output could rise if the average productivity of the remaining firms rises.  
Average productivity is determined by the firm composition effect.  As explained previously, low types
enter relative to high types when the firm surplus differential (going to high type) firms is excessive.  
Contract quits have a negative direct effect on loan rates and a negative indirect effect on loan rates
because household contact rates are reduced.  Because lower loan rates reduce the surplus differential, N
1 
falls.   The net effect on output and welfare balances a negative effect from reduced market liquidity with
a positive composition effect from an increase in the average productivity of (remaining) firms.  Under
the assumption that the market participation effect dominates (or production normality), output and
welfare fall with a rise in contract quits.  Interestingly, our results suggest that long-term relationships
(i.e., lower contract quit rates) increase aggregate output and raise loan interest rates to all firms16 The restriction on financial matching efficacy is met by imposing a sufficient condition on mo
such that  . µ<( rδ)/(1β)
24
(disproportionately more for high quality firms).  While the positive effects of long-term relationships on
the quantity and price of credit agree with the findings of Petersen and Rajan (1994) using small business
data, the prediction about disproportionate changes is empirically testable.
In order to derive sensible comparative dynamic results for entry cost shocks, we assume 
16
Condition Q:  (Financial Matching Efficacy)    There exists a  mo such that  





With this assumption we can show
 
Proposition 5: (Firm Profitability Shocks) Under the circumstances described in the Theorem, the
effects of productivity (A
i) and entry costs (ν0
i) on steady-state {η*, µ*, N
1*, R
i*, S*, U*, Y*, Ju
*}  are
given by:
(i) Productivity and entry cost shocks that raise the profitability of high types increase household
contact rates, market liquidity, and the share of low type firms, but lower firm contact rates
which raises the capital unemployment rate.  Productivity and entry cost shocks that raise the
profitability of low types will have opposite effects on these variables. 
(ii) Assuming production normality, productivity shocks raise loan rates, output, and welfare.  Cost
shocks tend to have the opposite effect (except for output where the outcome is open), assuming
production normality and that financial matching efficacy is not too high.
Proof: See Appendix. −
 
To understand the effects of  shocks that increase firm profitability    (due to either an increase ¯ a i
in A
i or a reduction in vo
i ), recall that there are two mechanisms at work.  First, when   (or  ) rises, ¯ a 1 ¯ a 217A critical relationship for understanding how the zero profit conditions respond to shocks is
given by    where the second term of the righthand side ¯ a i  p iR i  B
1  B
(¯ a i1)  (1β)βµ
rδβµ
N j(¯ a j  ¯ a i),
is negative (or positive) for i = 1 (or 2).
25
(or  ) rises less (or more) than proportionately because of differences in net ¯ a 1  p 1R 1 ¯ a 2  p 2R 2
expected productivity.
17  Zero-profit thus requires   to rise (or fall) which causes the capital η
unemployment rate to fall (rise).  The Beveridge Curve translates the change of   into a fall (or rise) of η
so that both market liquidity and market participation fall (rise).  Following the discussion of µ
Proposition 1, the direct effect of an increase in   (or  ) raises loan rates, but the indirect effect of ¯ a 1 ¯ a 2
lower (or higher)   causes them to fall (or rise).  Loan rates rise when   or   rises, where production µ¯ a 1 ¯ a 2
normality guarantees that indirect effects are not too large when the profitability shock benefits high
types.  Second, N
1 rises whenever shocks cause the firm surplus differential to be excessive.  From
Propositions 1 and 3, an increase in    leads to higher profitability for low type firms (A
1-R
1) and ¯ a 1
higher loan rate for high types (R
2) - the latter results in lower profitability for high type firms.  As a
consequence, the firm surplus differential decreases, implying a fall in N
1 so as to restore zero profit.  By
similar arguments, an increase in    gives rise to a higher N
1.  As before, the effect of profitability ¯ a 2
shocks on output balances market participation effects and average productivity effects, whereby the
latter is a sum of individual productivity effects and the composition effect.   Productivity shocks tend to
enhance average productivity directly, while their indirect effects tend to be offsetting.  Thus, production
normality guarantees that output will rise.  However, since entry cost shocks do not have a direct effect
on output and offsetting indirect effects, the normality argument cannot apply and it is unclear whether
output will rise or fall.  Notice that the effects of   and   on Ju* can be signed unambiguously only ¯ a 1 ¯ a 2
when production normality is imposed. 26
Overall, any shock that enhances matching rates causes aggregate liquidity to rise.  While an
increase in liquidity increases market participation by all firms, low quality firms enter disproportionately
and the average quality of firms falls (unless the shock raises the profitability of low quality firms).  
Thus, liquid markets may or may not be associated with high output and welfare, depending on whether
the composition effect on average quality outweighs  the effect on market participation.   Profitability
shocks (to productivity or entry costs) that benefit high type firms will enhance aggregate liquidity but
create a negative composition effect.  By assuming production normality, positive productivity shocks are
generally associated with higher output and welfare.  Positive financial market structure shocks will
increase market liquidity and market participation, but because of a strong composition effect output and
welfare may rise or fall.   Specifically, we find enhanced efficiency of the matching technology may lead
to lower welfare, but production normality guarantees that falling contract quit rates tend to raise welfare. 
6.  Summary and Extensions
In the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model, this paper has studied the role of
financial matchmakers in overcoming frictions arising from search and entry.  Thus, the analysis
identifies new channels through which financial intermediaries affect the size and quality of financial
flows.  Specifically, our analysis of financial matchmaking suggests that shocks that increase financial
market liquidity also lead to increased market participation by firms and a composition effect whereby
the participation of low quality firms rises disproportionately.  However, more liquid markets only
increase output and welfare when the market participation effect dominates the composition effect.  This
generally is the case when shocks enhance the profitability of firms or when they make contracts less
fragile (and financial relationships longer lasting).  By contrast, structural shocks that make financial
matchmaking more efficient may also have large composition effects.  We also demonstrate that the
extent of search frictions plays an important role in the determination of market loan rates and loan rate27
spreads.
There are a number of interesting extensions to pursue.  For brevity, we only mention two.  First,
one could allow financial matchmakers to endogenously choose matchmaking effort by maximizing their
output net of a real resource cost (in units of the flow rate of matches).  Making intermediaries more
active in this fashion provides an alternative argument for the existence of financial intermediaries that
can be compared with the coalition arguments of Prescott and Boyd (1986) and the middleman arguments
of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987).  Second, one could introduce asymmetric information about the
firm’s type.  This could be accomplished in two different ways that depend on the timing of firms’
actions.  When firms make their investment project selection (high or low type) prior to bank loan
approval, the adverse selection problem may exist as in the middleman theory developed by Biglaiser
(1993).  Alternatively, when firms select projects ex post, the moral hazard problem may arise.  In either
case, financial contracts must be incentive compatible.  Also, credit rationing may be present in equilibria
with asymmetric information.  This additional source of capital unemployment must be added to the
frictional capital unemployment considered here. 28
Figure 1: Steady-State Search Equilibrium with Differential Firm Entry29
Table 1: Summary of Comparative Statics
Effect of

















A 1 A 2 ν0
1 ν0
2
η*0 + +- -+
U* 0 - - + + -
µ* + - - + + -
S* + - - + + -
N
1*+ -- + + -
R
i*0 -  
2 + + 




1 0-  
2 ? + 
2 ?-  
2
Y* ? - 
2 +
 2 + 
2 ??
J*u ?-  
2 +




Note 1: To sign some of the effects of entry costs we require that   (or  ) is sufficiently small in m0 µ
condition Q. 
Note 2:  We assume production normality or condition P which in essence means the direct effect
dominates (and that composition effects are comparatively small).30
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Appendix
This Appendix contains proofs of Lemma 3 and Propositions 2-5 in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) From (15) it is immediate that jp
iR
i/jA
j > 0.  Differentiating with respect to A
i gives
jp iR i
jA i B 1
1B
1  N j(1β)µ
rδµ
>0







i)  j(p jR j)
jN i

















(rδβµ)2 [(1N i)(¯ a j¯ a i)  (1¯ a i)]  j(p jR j)
µ
>0for all i,j
(iv) Notice that jB/jδ > 0, and given 
i > 1, the first term in (15) is strictly decreasing in δ.  For i a
= 1, it is clear that the second term in (15) is also strictly decreasing in δ, implying jp
1R
1/jδ < 0. 








i B - jp
iR
i/jA
i < 0, the result is immediate.
Proof of Proposition 3:
From (16), we can derive    Thus both spreads are positive under R 2  R 1  β
p 2 (¯ a 2 ¯ a 1)  p 1p 2
p 1p 2 p 1R 1.
Condition D that ensures    Utilizing Proposition 2, we can see implies that   rises ¯ a 2 ¯ a 1 >0. R 2  R 1
with  and  , falls with   and  , may rise or fall with  , and is immune to    Moreover, from (17) µ¯ a 2 N 1 δ ¯ a 1 m0.
we obtain:
  R 2  R 1  limµSQ,v
i








p 1 (1β) 1
p 2  1
p 1 Θ
where   is a weighted sum of aggregate net Θ  rδ
rδβµ









0p 1[R 1(N 1,µ)1]  ν
1
0p 2[R 2(N 1,µ)1]  ν
2
0p 1(A 11)  ν
1
0p 2(A 21) (P1)
outputs and aggregate entry costs, which is positive under (A3) and Condition F.  Thus, given (A2), the
actual interest rate spread is smaller than that in the absence of search and entry frictions.
Proof of Lemma 3:





































2, we have that the pair {η*,N
1*} satisfying (14) given µ occur where Gdη*/dN
1*Gzp1 >
Gdη*/dN
1*Gzp2.  Since both locus’ are downward sloping, this pair is unique.  To characterize the (EZ)
locus, equate ZP1 and ZP2 from (14):










1 < 0.  Consider now that
µ increases.  Since p
iR
i is higher (for i = 1,2), (14) implies η must be higher.  However, this changes the




1 <  (>) 0. In either case, N
must rise to restore the equality in (P1), implying dη/dN
1GEZ > 0.  
To characterize the limit points of the EZ locus, consider the case where µS Q which implies η S
0 from (11).  From (15) p
iR
i S [(1-β)N




















Since   equating LHS with RHS and solving for N
1 yields RHS  (ν
2
0¯ a 1  ν
1
0¯ a 2)  (ν
1




































































































Thus, a condition for N







0a 2) @ β(a 2a 1)ν
2
0 (P2)
Now consider the limiting case where µS 0 which implies η S Q from (14).  From (15) p
iR
i S 1 + β(
i - a
1) > 1.  Thus, there exists an upper bound for η such that supN1 η(N
1) << Q.  Furthermore, there exists a
finite η
max << Q at N
1 = 1.
Proof of Propositions 4 and 5:
Totally differentiating (11) and (14) yields
where
Note that   and   .   C22  C32 dp iR i
dµ
<0< dp iR i






Thus,   .   We also compute comparative static effects: GCG C12(C21C31)C33 >0















   after substituting terms from above.
dp iR i
dm0





















m  Ju m0
Then (2) implies   and   are independent of  . J
i
m Ju m0
2.  Separation Rate:
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C31p 1(1 dR 1
dA 1)  C21p 2dR 2
dA 1 <0
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dA 2 >0




















































































substituted into the above relations.  Thus, if a temporary variable is defined by
































































































having to make any further assumptions beyond the simple Q-condition (in contrast to the assumptions 
needed to get  ).  
dN 1
dν
1
0
>0